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fifteen days of the date of acquisition. Formerly, the requirement was that the
currency be sold to a commercial bank within seven days of acquisition.
(4) The export of foreign currency is now free of restrictions. However, trans-
actions involving the purchase of immovable property or securities on a foreign
stock exchange require the permission of the Bank of Thailand. Furthermore, a
commercial bank that sells foreign currency is required to scrutinize the purpose
for which it is being bought, and limits are imposed on the amounts of foreign
currencies that such a commercial bank may sell to each individual. A limit of
U.S. $5 million or its equivalent is imposed for investment in foreign businesses
or for lending to subsidiaries. A limit of U.S. $1 million or its equivalent is the
maximum sum permitted for remittance to Thai citizens emigrating abroad or to
family relatives who live permanently abroad. The earlier regime had permitted
Thai residents traveling abroad to take out foreign currency of up to U.S. $1,000,
or larger amounts with the prior permission of the Bank of Thailand.
(5) The requirement for the registration of foreign loans to Thai nationals or in-
vestments in Thai businesses has now been revoked. However, such foreign exchange
remittances must be surrendered to commercial banks or deposited in a foreign cur-
rency account in Thailand within fifteen days from the date of their receipt.
(6) Restrictions on the repatriation of investment funds, dividends and profits,
loan repayments, and interest payments on loans, net of taxes due thereon, have
also been lifted. Also, securities, promissory notes, and bills of exchange may be
sent abroad without restrictions.
(7) Restrictions on the opening of foreign currency accounts in Thailand by
both Thai nationals and nonresidents without Bank of Thailand approval have
also been lifted, subject to various conditions. However, Thai nationals will be
subject to an aggregate balance limit of U.S. $500,000 (or its equivalent) for
individuals or U.S. $5 million (or its equivalent) for other legal entities, except
public agencies, state or governmental organizations, or depositors previously
permitted to have foreign currency accounts.
Switzerland*
On April 25, 1991, the Swiss Federal Banking Commission (FBC), in its
supervisory capacity, issued its regulation that attorneys, notaries, trust admin-
istrators, and money managers were no longer permitted to use the so-called
*Prepared by Nicolas Pidrard and Nicolas Killen, members of the law firm Borel, Barbey, de
Charmant, Dunant, Haffner & Associds, Geneva, Switzerland.
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Form B when opening a bank account on a fiduciary basis.' Until then, these
professionals were entitled to open accounts for their customers on a fiduciary
basis, that is, without revealing the identity of the beneficial owner of the funds,
mostly in the name of an offshore corporation or trust. This decision was inac-
curately interpreted by some commentators as the funeral of Swiss banking
secrecy. To some degree, the international press unfortunately echoed the asser-
tion and contributed to the spreading of the unfounded rumor.
The FBC's decision to abolish the so-called Form B accounts has, however,
neither abolished nor narrowed the protection provided by Swiss banking se-
crecy. A bank's legal obligation to preserve the confidentiality of its customers
remains unchanged.2 Swiss banks are prohibited from disclosing any information
about the identity or the affairs of a customer to any person, agency, or admin-
istration, whether it be the tax administration, an administrative agency, or other
inquirer. Exceptions to this rule are only possible (as they were prior to the FBC's
decision) in the event of criminal proceedings by the Swiss authorities or in the
context of international mutual assistance, mainly in criminal matters.
Thus, the decision was only meant to abolish the possibility, for certain pro-
fessionals, to open bank accounts in a fiduciary capacity without disclosing the
identity of the beneficial owner, except in specific circumstances listed in the
decision. The issue, therefore, must be analyzed in the context of the Agreement
on Due Diligence to be applied by the banks when accepting funds, rather than
the context of Swiss banking secrecy laws,
I. The Original Agreement on Due Diligence
of 1977 as Amended in 19823
The purpose of the Original Agreement on Due Diligence (Original Agree-
ment) was to preserve the reputation of Switzerland as a financial center and to
fight economic criminality by adopting compulsory rules on banking ethics. 4 The
Original Agreement was signed by the Swiss Bankers' Association and the Swiss
National Bank. Its objectives were to be achieved in part through strict identi-
fication of account-holders. 5 In order to comply with the Original Agreement the
I. Decision of the Federal Banking Commission (FBC) of April 25, 1991. See ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE Swiss BANKERS' ASSOCIATION 1990-1991, at 63.
2. Frderal Banking Act (Loi f6ddrale sur les banques et les caisses d'dpargne) of 1934, art. 47,
as amended by Recueil Systdmatique du droit f6ddral [RS] 952 (1971) [hereinafter FBA].
3. Agreement Relating to the Due Diligence to be Applied by the Banks When Accepting Funds
and to the Practice of Bank Secrecy (entered by and between the Swiss National Bank and the Swiss
Bankers' Association on July 1, 1977 (renewed and amended on July 1, 1982)), reprinted in 16
I.L.M. 767 [hereinafter Original Agreement on Due Diligence]. This agreement has been referred
to also as the Diligence Convention. See, e.g., 25 INT'L LAW. 525 (1991) (recent legal developments
in Switzerland).
4. Id. art. I.
5. Id. art. 2. The Original Agreement on Due Diligence also dealt with due care in renting safe
deposit boxes and prevention of assistance to capital flight and tax evasion. These aspects are not
dealt with in this article.
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banks had to establish the true identity of the beneficial owner of the deposited
funds, whether the holder of the account was an individual, a corporation,
foundation, trust, or other entity.6 This duty extended to the identification of the
true beneficial owner of the assets deposited with the bank and, in the case of
offshore corporations, to the controlling person.
7
Article 6 of the Original Agreement reserved for the Swiss holders of profes-
sional secrecy (principally attorneys and auditors) the right to open bank ac-
counts, but in a fiduciary capacity.8 In such circumstances the names of the
clients were not disclosed to the bank. The secrecy-bound persons were, how-
ever, required to sign the "Form B," by which they acknowledged that they
knew the client's name and that they were unaware of any intended use of bank
secrecy contrary to the Original Agreement. 9 The impact of the provision was
great since the professional secrecy of an attorney could not (and still cannot) be
lifted, even in criminal investigations.'O
Prior to the expiration date of the Original Agreement, the FBC clearly ex-
pressed its views on the construction of the privilege granted to the persons
bound by professional secrecy. For the FBC it was inadmissible that a client
could remain anonymous to his bank by interposing a person bound by profes-
sional secrecy." According to the FBC the duty to identify the beneficial owner
of the funds deposited with a bank derived from article 3, paragraph 2(c) of the
Federal Banking Act of 1934.12 If, under the FBA, secrecy was subject to federal
and cantonal procedural rules regarding the duty to testify, that provision made
it a duty for bankers to offer a testimony as informative as possible. Thus,
according to the FBC, if the beneficial owner could remain unknown to the bank,
this "duty" would be less effective.'
3
Strangely enough, the FBC's position on this topic was reaffirmed on various
occasions. ' 4 In its 1986 Banking Report, the FBC stated that it "could" require
the banks under its supervision to identify the clients represented by attorneys-
at-law by means of compulsory regulations.' 5 In substance, the Commission
wanted to eliminate the possibility for lawyers and notaries (who cannot be
compelled to testify even in criminal matters) to sign the Form B when their
activity involved managing funds on behalf of their clients. 16
6. Id. art. 3.
7. Implementing Rules of the Original Agreement on Due Diligence by the Swiss National
Bank and the Swiss Bankers' Association relating to arts. 3, 4, and 5.
8. See supra note 3.
9. Original Agreement on Due Diligence, supra note 3, art. 6.
10. Federal Law on Criminal Procedure art. 77, RS 312.0.
11. 1985 FEDERAL BANKING COMMISSION REPORT 23.
12. Article 3(2)(c) of the FBA provides that the persons in charge of the direction and man-
agement of the banks are to be of good reputation and shall guarantee irreproachable activity.
13. 1985 FEDERAL BANKING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 21.
14. See, e.g., letter from the Federal Banking Commission to Dr. Felix H. Thomann, president
of the Swiss Lawyers' Association (Oct. 2, 1986).
15. 1986 FEDERAL BANKING COMMISSION REPORT 124.
16. Id. page 126.
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II. The New Agreement on Due Diligence of July 1, 1987
Under pressure from the FBC, the Swiss Association of Bankers drafted the
New Agreement on Due Diligence (New Agreement) dated July 1, 1987, which
became effective on October 1, 1987.17 Since the Swiss National Bank had
announced in 1985 that it would no longer be a party to the Original Agreement
(claiming that it was responsible for monetary policy, not for banking ethics), the
New Agreement was signed by the Swiss Association of Bankers and the sig-
natory banks. The New Agreement restated the essential provisions of the Orig-
inal Agreement, reinforcing some points and clarifying others. The most drastic
amendment, of course, concerned the new conditions under which a person
bound by professional secrecy could open an account in a fiduciary capacity for
his client, that is, sign the Form B.
According to the New Agreement, the secrecy-bound professional was to
confirm, in addition to the previous requirements set forth in the Original Agree-
ment, 18 that he was acting within the scope of his professional capacity as an
attorney, a notary, an asset manager, or auditor, and that his mandate was not
temporary and not for the principal purpose of keeping the name of the beneficial
owner secret from the bank.19 The new Form B to be signed by attorneys and
notaries required them to certify that their mandate was not chiefly targeted
toward the management of funds. On the contrary, the new Form B to be signed
by auditors and asset managers expressly required them to confirm that the
account was opened with a mandate to manage funds.
In the opinion of the FBC, 2° the cases in which the intervention of the holder of
professional secrecy was to be admitted were more limited than those stated in the
New Agreement. Thus, the future of the new Form B was already uncertain.
III. The Enactment of the New
Anti-Money-Laundering "Arsenal"
In 1990, the Swiss Penal Code (SPC) was amended by the introduction of two
new articles dealing with money laundering and the lack of vigilance in financial
transactions. Articles 305bis and 305ter SPC2 1 came into force on August 1,
1990.22
17. New Agreement Relating to the Due Diligence to be Applied by the Banks (concluded by and
between the Swiss Bankers' Association and the signatory banks on July 1, 1987) [hereinafter New
Agreement on Due Diligence].
18. Original Agreement on Due Diligence, supra note 3, art. 6.
19. New Agreement on Due Diligence, supra note 17, art. 5.
20. 1986 FEDERAL BANKING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 125-26.
21. Recueil Official des lois et ordonnances de la Conf6deration suisse [RO] 1990 1077, 1078;
Feuille Feddrale [FF] 1989 11961; Swiss PENAL CODE [SPC], RS 311.
22. See 25 INtr'L LAW. 525 (1991) (regional developments summary pertaining to Switzerland
prepared by Pierre de Charmant and Nicolas Pi6rard).
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In substance, article 305bis SPC punishes those who receive money or assets
that are the product of an offense. 23 This provision penalizes acts that tend to
impede the identification of the source and the discovery or the confiscation of
assets that the committer knows or should have known were derived from a
crime. Article 305ter SPC24 requires financial intermediaries to implement in-
ternal procedures in order to identify the beneficial owner of the assets with
which they are entrusted. Under the disposition, an individual who, in the con-
duct of his profession, accepts, keeps on deposit, helps to transfer, or invests
assets belonging to a third party, and who omits to verify with the vigilance
commanded by the circumstances the identity of the beneficial owner, will be
punished by imprisonment for up to one year, or fined, or both. In contrast to the
New Agreement, the new criminal provision applies to all members of the Swiss
financial community such as money changers, fiduciary institutions, asset man-
agers, finance companies, and lawyers, among others. The punishable act is the
failure to exercise the degree of care required under the specific circumstances in
verifying the identity of the beneficial owner of the funds. A violation of the
obligation to identify the beneficial owner constitutes an offense under article
305ter SPC even though the funds deposited are not the result of a crime.
The enactment of the new criminal provision was undoubtedly caused by
various factors, some of which were not internal to Switzerland. First, the FBC
as well as various groups repeatedly claimed that the Original Agreement and the
1987 New Agreement were inadequate in fighting money laundering. 25 This
point of view gained support in the wake of various scandals in Switzerland, one
of which became known as the "Lebanon Connection."
26
Second, prior to the enactment of the new provisions, money laundering was
not expressly illegal in Switzerland. Thus, mutual assistance in criminal matters
could not be granted failing the double incrimination requirement. The Swiss
authorities were pressured by various foreign governments, particularly the
United States, into adopting provisions that would enable them to pierce Swiss
banking secrecy.
23. SPC art. 305bis states:
I. He who shall have committed an act tending to impede the identification of the source, the discovery or the
confiscation of assets which he knew or should have known to be of criminal origin shall be punished by
imprisonment or a fine.
2. In serious cases, the punishment shall be criminal confinement for no more than five years. The imprisonment
shall be concurrent with a fine of up to one million francs. The case is serious, particularly, when the perpetrator:
a) acts as member of a criminal organization;
b) acts as member of a gang formed to systematically engage in money laundering;
c) makes a significant turnover or gain in engaging in money laundering by profession.
3. The perpetrator shall also be punished when the principal offense has been committed outside of Switzerland
and it is also punishable in the country in which it has been perpetrated.
24. SPC art. 305ter states:
He who, in the conduct of his profession, shall have accepted, kept on deposit, helped to invest or transfer assets
belonging to a third party and who shall have omitted to verify with the vigilance commanded by the circumstances
the identity of the beneficial owner, shall be punished by imprisonment for at most one year or by arrest and/or a
fine.
25. See 1986 FEDERAL BANKING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15.
26. See FF 1989 1I 977.
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Declaration on opening an account or securities account
(Form A as per Art. 3 and 4 CDB)
The undersigned hereby declares:
(mark with a cross where applicable)
- as holder of the account,
D that he is the beneficial owner of the assets to be deposited with the bank,
ED that the beneficial owner of the assets to be deposited with the bank is:
Full name (or firm) Address/Domicile/Country
(or location of head office)
D as representative of the account holder,
that the following person(s) is/are the beneficial owner(s) of the assets to be
deposited with the bank:
Full name (or firm) Address/Domicile/Country
(or location of head office)
The undersigned takes due note that:
-the banking secrecy privilege protected by Art. 47 of the Federal Law on Banks
and Savings Banks of November 8, 1934/March 11, 1971 is not unrestricted.
The officers, employees and mandataries of the bank are liable to provide
evidence and information vis-A-vis the authorities when required to do so under
federal or cantonal laws (such as during a criminal proceeding). Such an obli-
gation also exists vis-A-vis foreign authorities, insofar as the Swiss Confedera-
tion grants judicial assistance to the country concerned;
-the system of numbered or coded accounts and deposits is a purely internal
measure of the bank and in no way affects the obligation to provide evidence or
to testify to the authorities.
Full name, or firm, if applicable
Exact address
Place and date Signature
VOL. 26, NO. 2
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IV. The FBC's Circular Letter of April 25, 1991
While the FBC's opinion regarding the exemption resulting from the New
Agreement was one factor in the "demise" of the so-called Form B accounts, the
enactment of article 305ter SPC certainly accelerated the decline of the exemp-
tion provision. In the circular letter, the FBC restated that the obligation for the
banks to identify the beneficial owner of the funds deposited was anchored in the
legal requirement of irreproachable activity found in article 3 of the Federal
Banking Act. 27 After having described the obligations under article 305ter SPC
and the exemption applicable to certain professionals under the New Agree-
ment, 28 the FBC concluded that the latter was incompatible with the legal ob-
ligation set forth in article 305ter SPC. 29 According to the Commission the
recourse to the Form B could be reconciled neither with the letter nor with the
purpose of the criminal provision. Therefore, as of July 1, 1991, banks were
prohibited from accepting Form B in the context of the opening of a bank
account. Furthermore, banks were given until September 30, 1992, to replace all
outstanding Forms B by either a new Form A or a declaration by an attorney or
notary consistent with the new regulation. 30
V. The Form A: The Remaining Cases Where
Fiduciary Accounts Are Allowed
Contrary to the New Agreement, 3 1 banks now have the obligation, when in
doubt, to identify the real beneficial owner of the funds deposited by an inter-
mediary. This identification is to occur by means of Form A. The name and
address of the beneficial owner must be indicated to the bank even when the
account is opened by an attorney, a notary, an auditor, or asset manager.
However, in light of the professional secrecy sanctioned in the SPC 32 and the
principle of proportionality, banks are entitled not to question the identity of the
beneficial owner of the assets deposited by attorneys and notaries in a limited set
of recognizable circumstances. Without abolishing completely the privilege
granted under the New Agreement, the FBC largely restricted its scope and the
persons entitled to keep secret the identity of their clients. Only lawyers and
notaries may now do so in the following four cases: 33
(1) omnibus clients' trust accounts for the handling of advance payments to
attorneys for fees, court fees, indemnifications, and the like;
(2) deposit of assets belonging to an estate during the settlement thereof (the
estate must be identified);
27. FBC Circular Letter, para. 1.1 (dated April 25, 1991) [hereinafter 1991 Circular Letter].
28. Id. paras. 1.2 & 1.3.
29. Id. paras. 2.1 & 2.2.
30. Id. para. 4.2.
31. New Agreement on Due Diligence, supra note 17, para. 5.
32. SPC art. 321.
33. 1991 Circular Letter, supra note 26, para. 3.
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(3) deposit of assets in connection with a separation or divorce (the couple
must be identified); and
(4) escrow accounts for the deposit of advance payments and of assets in
which the ownership is disputed, both in connection with pending liti-
gation, arbitration, bankruptcy, or composition of creditors' proceedings
(the litigation must be identified).
Attorneys and notaries are now required to submit a written declaration guaran-
teeing their compliance with these accepted exceptions.
34
Lastly, the regulation states that banks will have to cease all business rela-
tionships if they are unable to identify before September 30, 1992, the beneficial
owner of the assets deposited, whether by a Form A or a declaration by a lawyer
or notary.
35
VI. Swiss Banking Secrecy Unchanged
Bank secrecy lies in a client's right to an agreement with his banker that all his
relationships with the bank will be kept confidential from third parties. 36 The
bases on which banking secrecy lies are to be found in the Swiss Civil Code, the
Swiss Code of Obligations, the FBA, and the SPC. 3 7 However, banking secrecy
was never meant to allow a client to hide his identity from the bank itself. This
confusion was and still is the main cause of the misunderstanding behind the
FBC's regulation prohibiting the use of the Form B accounts. Thus, the existence
of a relationship between the bank and the client, the nature of the latter, the
information given by the client on his financial situation, his relationship with
other banks, and information concerning operations with third parties are cer-
tainly protected by banking secrecy; but the disclosure to the bank of the client's
identity is not so protected.
The question of the full submission to the FBA is of the utmost importance
since it is through article 47 of the FBA that banking secrecy is placed under the
protection of criminal law. Article 47 is only applicable when a client has
established a relationship with an entity subject to the FBA.3 s Consequently,
relationships maintained with the following entities are not protected by the
banking secrecy: stock exchange agents and stock exchange firms that merely
trade in securities and do not engage in regular banking transactions; private
investment managers and notaries (except when they invest on a regular basis the
34. Id.
35. Id. para. 4.3.
36. FBA art. 47.
37. Swiss CIVIL CODE art. 28, RS 210 (1907); FEDERAL CODE OF OBLIGATIONS arts. 394, 398,
RS 220 (1911); FBA art. 47; SPC art. 321.
38. According to article I of the FBA the concept of banks (at large) includes banks (in the
narrow sense), private bankers (partnerships) and savings banks. Finance companies that solicit
deposits from the public are also regarded as banks.
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funds of their clients for their own account or their names, in which case they are
subject to the FBA); bank-like finance companies and other financial companies
not soliciting the public for deposits. Thus, in case of violation of the profes-
sional secrecy by such persons, the penalty set forth in article 47 FBA is not
applicable.
Persons who may incur the penalty if they breach the obligation of confiden-
tiality due to a client include the following:39 (1) officers (directors, managers,
private bankers, partners of a partnership); (2) employees at large (all the per-
sons employed in a bank); (3) mandataries (agents), persons to whom the bank
gives a mandate in the course of its commercial activity; (4) liquidators or
commissioners; (5) experts, representatives of the FBC; and (6) officers and
employees of an auditing firm. On a civil-law level, the individuals or corpora-
tions subject to banking secrecy can be held liable for the damages incurred by
the client that result from the violation of banking secrecy.
40
VIII. Limits of Banking Secrecy
A. VIS-A-VIS THE Swiss AUTHORrrIES
Article 47 of the FBA specifically reserves the application of federal and
cantonal regulations regarding the obligation to testify and to furnish information
to the authorities. The nature of the proceeding determines the scope of the
obligation to assist the authorities.
1. Civil Procedure
The obligation to testify or submit documents before a civil court will mainly
be determined by the rules of civil procedure of the specific canton, since the
cantons have jurisdiction under the Swiss Constitution to regulate their own
courts and the proceedings brought before them. 4' The Swiss Federal Tribunal4
2
does not review the facts established in lower court proceedings, nor does it hear
witnesses or documentary evidence not submitted to the lower court.43 At the
cantonal level, solutions differ from one canton to another. Geneva recognizes
the right for any person bound by a legal obligation of confidentiality, including
bankers, to refuse to testify. In Zurich, it is within the judge's discretion to decide
whether the case or the interests involved dictate that the person under duty of
confidentiality be required to testify.
39. FBA art. 47.
40. See FEDERAL CODE OF OBLIGATIONs arts. 41, 97 (containing general principles of responsi-
bility).
41. BUNDERSVERFASSUNG [Constitution] art. 64(3); RO 16 824, 827; RS 101 (1874); reprinted
in 27 CONSTIUTIONS OF THE WORLD 52 (Albert P. Blankstein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds.) (Jurg K.
Siegentheler, trans.) (1982) (in English).
42. The Federal Tribunal is the Swiss Supreme Court.
43. Federal Law on Judicial Organization, arts. 41, 42, 43, RS 173.110 (1943).
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2. Criminal Procedure
The only persons entitled not to testify are priests, doctors, lawyers, public
notaries, chemists, and midwives and their assistants." This exemption applies
at the federal level as well as in most cantons. Therefore, a banker has to testify
when required to and must produce all the documents that appear to be necessary
to the procedure. In this respect, Swiss bankers now have the obligation to know
the origin of the funds deposited, the identity of the client, and the name of the
beneficial owner of the assets. Thus, it is clear that banks must reveal such
information if asked.
3. Administrative Procedure
This topic deals only with the possible inquiries of the tax administrations. As
a general principle, tax authorities, in the ordinary course of taxation proceed-
ings, have no right to obtain from third parties information or documentation
regarding a taxpayer. Consequently, the tax administration has no power to
investigate directly or require a bank to provide information or documents re-
garding a client (the bank would breach its duty to the client by merely acknowl-
edging that the taxpayer has or had a bank account).
However, Swiss law makes a distinction between tax evasion and tax fraud,
both at the federal and cantonal levels. Tax evasion is generally defined as being
the nonreporting of income or capital, that is, the simple failure to report taxable
items or pay taxes. 45 Tax fraud, on the other hand, is a more serious offense and
is realized when a taxpayer uses deception to mislead the tax authorities.4 6
At the federal and cantonal levels, tax evasion is only an administrative of-
fense punishable by a fine. 47 In this context, tax administrations are not empow-
ered to require information to be given by third parties bearing a professional or
legal duty of secrecy. 48 Thus, the confidentiality of all information covered by
banking secrecy is guaranteed, and banks are under no obligation to testify or
assist the authorities. Tax fraud, on the other hand, is qualified as a criminal
offense49 and must be pursued through a criminal procedure, either by the
ordinary criminal courts or by the administrative authorities 50 (according to
criminal administrative law). Tax fraud is considered to be a criminal offense by
the most important federal statutes governing taxes and duties. 5' At the cantonal
level, the qualification differs from one canton to another. However, the most
important cantons in banking matters (Zurich, Geneva, and Basel) all prosecute
44. Federal Law on Criminal Procedure, art. 77, RS 312.0 (1939).
45. Federal Decree on Federal Income (AIFD, in French), art. 129, RS 642.11 (1940).
46. Id. art. 130bis.
47. Id. art. 129(l).
48. Id. art. 90(b).
49. Id. art. 133bis.
50. Criminal Administrative Procedure Law, RS 313.0 (1974).
51. Federal Law on Stamp Tax art. 50, RS 641.10 (1973); Federal Law on Withholding Tax art.
67, RS 642.21 (1965); Importation Duty Law art. 41(1), RS 641.20 (1941).
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tax fraud through criminal proceedings. In these situations bankers will have to
testify and produce documents if so requested. Banking secrecy will thus be
lifted in a procedure for tax fraud. Furthermore, the authorities may directly
investigate in the banks and seize relevant documents.52
B. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE
Article 271 SPC prohibits the unauthorized execution of foreign acts of state
on Swiss territory and punishes the offenders by imprisonment. Therefore, a
foreign authority wishing to obtain information, documentary evidence, or tes-
timony from a resident of Switzerland, has to request the authorization of the
Swiss authorities. Such authorization will rarely be granted. Thus, a foreign
authority must usually resort to judicial and administrative assistance.
1. Assistance in Criminal Matters
Switzerland is a party to the European Convention on Judicial Assistance in
Criminal Matters. 53 Switzerland's cooperation is granted to the contracting states
when there are criminal proceedings falling within the competence of judicial
authorities. Switzerland nevertheless refuses to assist foreign countries when it
considers that the offense is of a political or tax nature. 54 In all cases where the
cooperation requested involves the use of coercion (seizure of documents, search
in someone's premises, and the like), Switzerland will grant assistance provided
the acts prosecuted in the foreign state also constitute a criminal offense under
Swiss law.55 Lifting of banking secrecy always implies coercion and, therefore,
the assistance allowed by Switzerland will be limited to acts criminal under its
internal legislation.56
A Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between Switzerland and
the United States was signed on May 25, 1973, and entered into force on Jan-
uary 23, 1977. 57 The treaty is not applicable where the offense prosecuted is of
a political, military, tax, or antitrust nature.5 8 Furthermore, when the request for
assistance implies measures of coercion, Switzerland will assist the United States
if the acts described in the request contain the elements of an offense that would
be punishable under the law in Switzerland if the offense were committed within
52. Criminal Administrative Procedure Law, art. 50.
53. European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Apr. 20, 1959, 472
U.N.T.S. 1851 RS 0.351.1.
54. Id. art. 2(a). But see part VII.B.2. infra as to tax fraud.
55. Id. art 5(1)(a).
56. Id. arts. 2, 5.
57. Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, U.S.-Switz., 27 U.S.T. 2019, RS
0.351.933.6 [hereinafter Criminal Assistance Treaty].
58. Id. art. 2(1)(c). Note, however, assistance may be possible for offenses involving customs
and tax laws when they constitute violations of gambling and betting regulations, or drugs, weapons,
and explosives regulations. Id. art. 2(l)(c)(5). The same is true when the offenses are connected with
organized crime. Id. art. 2(2).
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its jurisdiction and if it is listed in the schedule annexed to the treaty or is
described in item 26 of the schedule. 59 A schedule of the offenses for which
measures of coercion may be taken is annexed to the treaty.6 0 However, in the
case of an offense not listed in the schedule, the central authority of the requested
state (in Switzerland the Federal Police Department) shall determine whether the
importance of the offense justifies the use of compulsory measures. 6' Further-
more, differences in technical designation and constituent elements added to
establish jurisdiction can be ignored. If any of the conditions mentioned above
have not been met, assistance can still be granted but without the use of compul-
sory measures. Thus, banking secrecy may be lifted pursuant to a request of
assistance under the treaty.
62
Lastly, Switzerland has adopted a Federal Act on International Assistance in
Criminal Matters, which entered into force on January 1, 1983.63 The main
feature of the Act was to spell out for the first time that international assistance
is to be made available in cases of tax fraud offenses. 64 All countries, including
those that have entered into a treaty with Switzerland, may request the assistance
of the Swiss authorities through the Act. 65 However, Swiss cooperation is dis-
cretionary. 66 The Act also incorporates another fundamental principle derived-
from Switzerland's internal laws: the refusal to provide any assistance when the
acts prosecuted constitute a tax evasion offense or a violation of the regulation
concerning the monetary, commercial, or economic policy of the foreign state. 67
As mentioned previously, cooperation may be granted in case of tax fraud
offenses. In that case, the assistance is limited to the transmitting of information,
documents, and testimonies but does not include extradition by Switzerland.68
Tax fraud is defined under the federal administrative criminal law.
The Act on Assistance contains various provisions on the delicate issue of the
protection of the private sphere. Article 9 of the Act refers to the Swiss provisions
59. Id. art. 4(1).
60. See generally id.
61. Id. art. 2(2)-(3).
62. One should point out that the Swiss Federal Police Department has not in the past shown any
particular restraint in providing assistance to the U.S. authorities. Thus, banking secrecy will often
be lifted in these proceedings.
63. Federal Act on Assistance in Criminal Matters, RS 351.1 (1981).
64. Id. art. 3(3).
65. Jeannine Gremaud, Entraide administrative et judiciaire en matire fiscale, 30 ETUDES
SUISSES DE DROIT EUROPIEN 187, 207 (1986).
66. For example, Switzerland may refuse to cooperate with countries whose concept of criminal
law is in complete contradiction with essential Swiss legal principles. Federal Act on Assistance in
Criminal Matters, art. 1.
67. Id. art. 3(l), 3(3).
68. Id. art. 3(3). It provides that assistance in case of tax fraud is given according to the third
part of the law. Extradition and enforcement of foreign decisions are respectively set forth in the
second and fifth parts of the law. Thus they are excluded from the scope of the assistance given for
tax fraud offenses.
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concerning the right to refuse to testify. 69 Accordingly, in a criminal pursuit,
priests, lawyers, and doctors have the right to refuse to testify. Other persons
(bankers, for example) are obliged to testify and to produce documents if re-
quired. Lastly, Switzerland has always required that the use of the evidence and
information obtained through the procedure of cooperation be limited to the
prosecution of the offense upon which the assistance was granted.7 °
2. Administrative Assistance
International administrative assistance in tax matters is primarily based on the
double taxation treaties entered into by Switzerland. The treaties signed with
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Italy, New Zealand,
and Germany all include a clause providing for the exchange of such information
as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of the treaty. 7' In practice, Swit-
zerland agrees to transmit information that is proven to be necessary for the
proper application of a double taxation treaty even if the latter does not expressly
provide for the exchange of such information. 72 However, information will not
be exchanged for the purpose of assisting the foreign state in applying its own tax
legislation. Furthermore, the treaties that provide for an exchange of information
all contain a limitation in the sense that no information revealing a business,
industrial, or professional secret or trade process may be disclosed.73 The treaties
with Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, and Italy mention bank
secrecy expressly. 74 However, it has always been held that business and profes-
sional secrets include bank secrecy. According to the practice of the Swiss
Federal Tax Administration, international administrative assistance is exclusively
granted in the form of a so-called "official report," which contains the results of
the examination conducted by the Federal Tax Administration. This means that
69. Criminal Administrative Procedure Law art. 69.
70. Federal Act on Assistance in Criminal Matters art. 67.
71. Agreements Concerning the Avoidance of Double Taxation (along with citations to certain
information exchange clauses):
" Jan. 30, 1974, Switz.-Aust., art. 26(1), 980 U.N.T.S. 119, RO 1974 11 at 2085);
" Aug. 28, 1978, Switz.-Bel., art. 27(1), RO 1980 II at 1456P; see IBFD, Amsterdam, Eu-
ropean Taxation, Sup. Service Section C.
" Aug. 20, 1976, Switz.-Can., art 25(1), RO 1977 II at 1526; see IBFD, Amsterdam, Euro-
pean Taxation, Sup. Service Section C.
" Nov. 23, 1973, Switz.-Den., 958 U.N.T.S. 27, RO 1974 II at 1720;
" Sept. 9, 1966, Switz.-Fr., art. 28, 772 U.N.T.S. 275, RO 1967 II at 1119;
" Sept. 30, 1954, Switz.-U.K., art. xx, 209 U.N.T.S. 197 RO 1955 11 at 329;
" Mar. 9, 1976, Switz.-Italy, art. 27(1), RO 1979 1 at 461; see IBFD, Amsterdam, European
Taxation, Sup. Service Section C.
" June 6, 1980, Switz.-N.Z., art. 24(1), RO 1981 11 at 1812;
* Aug. 11, 1971, Switz.-Germany, art. 27, RO 1972 II, at 3128; see IBFD, Amsterdam,
European Taxation, Sup. Service Section C.
72. See Gremaud, supra note 65.
73. See supra note 71.
74. Id.
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documents are not normally produced and witnesses' depositions are not trans-
mitted to a foreign authority.
75
The Double Taxation Agreement entered by and between Switzerland and the
United States in 195176 contains a clause on the exchange of information with a
larger scope than those examined above. Article XVI provides that the competent
authorities will also exchange such information as is necessary for the prevention of
tax fraud and the like in relation to the taxes that are covered by the treaty. The Swiss
Federal Tribunal held in 1970 that, under this clause, bank information was basically
obtainable; consequently, and in order to satisfy U.S. requests related to information
necessary for the prevention of tax fraud, bank secrecy could not be invoked. 7 7 This
decision was criticized by a majority of legal authors, 7 8 who have noted that ac-
cording to article XVI of the agreement, professional secrecy, including bank se-
crecy, should prevail over the general mutual assistance obligation. In 1975 the
Swiss Federal Tribunal specified the limits of the cooperation that could be granted
under the Swiss-U.S. Agreement and stated that article XVI called for the exchange
of information in the form of a written report, but did not prescribe actual judicial
assistance, which would include the deposition of witnesses.79 On this occasion, the
Swiss Federal Tribunal ordered the Federal Tax Administration not to grant the
extended assistance requested by the Internal Revenue Service. 80 The scope of the
assistance set forth in article XVI has become a relatively moot issue since the
enactment of the Federal Act on International Assistance in Criminal Matters,
8 1
which allows cooperation in cases of tax fraud offenses.
VIII. Conclusion
As one may see, the FBC's decision of April 25, 1991, to prohibit the opening
of Form B accounts must be dissociated from the obligations and privileges
derived from banking secrecy. In this context and in view of the relative com-
plexity of these and related issues, the circular letter of the FBC was meant to
restrict the ability of a bank to receive funds without having to inquire into the
origin and the beneficial owner of the assets. The new regulation was not de-
signed to narrow the scope of banking secrecy and has not produced that result.
Any revision of the Swiss bank secrecy laws would require an amendment of the
Federal Banking Act by parliament or by national referendum.
75. 75b CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL [C.D. Fisc. INT'L], 499ss (1990).
76. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income,
May 24, 1951, U.S.-Switz., 2 U.S.T. 1751, RO 1951 at 895.
77. Judgment of Dec. 23, 1970 (X. c. Administration f6d6rale des contributions), Schweiz-
erisches Bundesgericht [Federal Tribunal], [19711 JdT 571.
78. MAURICE AUBERT, JEAN-PHILIPPE KERNER & HERBERT SCHONLE, LE SECRET BANCAIRE
SUISSE 390 (1982).
79. Judgment of May 16, 1975 (X-und Y-Bank gegen Eidgenossische Steuerverwaltung)
Schweizerisches Bundesgericht [Federal Tribunal] ATF 101 Ib at 160.
80. Id.
81. See supra part VII.B.I.
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